Three countries imported Ebola from DR Congo in 2026, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda.
On 13 November, Nigeria completed 21 days of monitoring for all 62 contacts of its imported Bundibugyo Ebola case.
Thirteen developed symptoms and all tested negative.
The patient recovered after evacuation to Switzerland.
Remarkably, Nigeria detected zero secondary cases.
It seems there is good news across the region.
Nigeria and Kenya have completed contact follow-up and are in the 42-day surveillance period.
Uganda declared its outbreak over on 27 August.
Only the Democratic Republic of Congo is still reporting ongoing local transmission in this outbreak.
Kenya recorded nine confirmed cases and two deaths after one importation.
Four relatives and four health workers were infected.
All eight were already in quarantine when symptoms began, and no further spread was documented.
Uganda recorded 20 confirmed cases and two deaths, with 15 imported and five locally acquired infections.
Nigeria itself had a different experience in 2014.
A traveller who arrived already ill with Zaire ebolavirus sparked an outbreak of 19 confirmed cases, one probable case and eight deaths.
Nine health workers acquired Ebola directly from him.
This time, the Abuja patient arrived from Uganda on 3 October and fell ill four days later.
She sought care on 10 October, was admitted the next day with fever and diarrhoea, and was initially treated for suspected malaria.
Ebola was confirmed on 20 October. She was potentially infectious during those nine days in hospital.
How many of her 62 contacts had direct, unprotected exposure to her body fluids, and what precautions were in place?
Historical Ebola household studies estimated secondary infection rates of 0.8 percent without direct contact and about 48 percent among people providing nursing care.
The difference matters because 62 listed contacts may include very few people with substantial exposure.
Her husband was among those followed, but we know little about the care he provided.
I wonder whether fewer people gave hands-on care in Abuja because of household routines or because she chose to limit contact while unwell.
The Kenyan patient died two days after admission and may have needed more intensive care.
Did more relatives spend time with him or provide hands-on care while he was ill?
The four occupational infections also warrant a review of the precautions used during initial care at The Nairobi Hospital.
A fair comparison requires exposure and infection-control records from both hospitals.
But people are yet to see a published account of who was exposed in Abuja before effective isolation.
The world would like to get a de-identified comparison of the Nigerian and Kenyan cases, with independent reporting on the findings.
Who provided care at home and in hospital? When did precautions begin?
What can available viral-load data tell us alongside the clinical timelines?
For now, the known chains of transmission in Kenya and Uganda have been contained, and Nigeria detected zero secondary cases.
Understanding how these different outcomes arose could help protect families and frontline staff from the first encounter, before anyone suspects Ebola.




